

**NEW JERSEY CRIME VICTIMS' LAW CENTER**  
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New Jersey Department of Corrections  
Division of Parole and Community Programs  
Victim Notification Program  
P.O. Box 863  
Trenton, NJ 08625  
ATTN: MELANIE BOSTON  
SUPERVISOR OF VICTIM SERVICES

**RE: STATE v. JOHNNY D. WILLIAMS**  
**ATLANTIC COUNTY FILE # 98-002576**  
**VICTIM- MARLY KAY CONNORS**

Dear Ms. Boston:

In furtherance of my letter of December 13, 2005 and our telephone conversation thereafter, I have attempted to secure certain documentation in support of our position that convicted killer Johnnie D. Williams should not be transferred to a residential community release program. He was convicted in 1999 of Aggravated Manslaughter, killing the victim Marly Kay Connors in 1995. Williams was sentenced to 22

New Jersey State Prison. He has been denied parole twice, and now, just six years after being sent to prison, he seeks to be relieved of the burdens of formal incarceration.

On behalf of Marly's survivors, I once again assert their strong objection to such a dramatic and premature reduction of sentence. For the consideration of the review committee, I enclose the following:

1. The letter of Susan H. Curcio, Esq., attorney for the victim's 75 year old mother, Dorothy J. Feckley to the New Jersey State Parole Board. This letter eloquently sets forth a persuasive argument against any consideration being given to this convicted killer.
2. The letter of Atlantic County Assistant Prosecutor Scott D. Northridge to the New Jersey State Parole Board dated December 23, 2002 opposing parole for Mr. Williams. This letter accurately and forcefully describes the criminal and violent nature of the prisoner, and offers numerous justifications for denying any consideration to him to lighten his sentence.
3. The passionate and heartfelt letter of Marly's mother, Dorothy Feckley.
4. A copy of a memorial from the victim's mother and two sons, Lance and Heath showing an early photo of Marly.
5. A copy of a photograph of the victim.

When someone is murdered, there is created a river of grief that will continue to flow until everyone who ever knew that person is dead. The attachments to this letter clearly evidence this fact. The death of Marly Kay Connors is also about the survival of those she left behind.

The victim's children, Lance and Heath and her mother Dorothy are by constitutional mandate and statutory enactment defined as "victims" of this crime. Pursuant to law, they are entitled to be treated with fairness, compassion, respect and dignity in the criminal justice process. See N.J. Const., Article I, par.22 and N.J.S.A.52:4B-36. These rights are among the most fundamental and important in assuring public confidence in the criminal justice system." See N.J.S.A. 52:4B-35. Furthermore, these rights extend to post conviction proceedings.

It is evident that the anguish caused by the criminal actions of Johnnie Williams has not diminished over the six years since he was convicted of killing Marly Connors. As the statement of Dorothy Feckley notes, she fears that given the opportunity Williams will kill her or some other innocent victim. As a victim, Mrs. Feckley and her family have the right to be “free from intimidation” and fear in the criminal justice process. See N.J.S.A.52:4B-36.

The courts of the State of New Jersey have recognized the constitutional rights of the crime victim in many cases. *See, e.g.*; State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23 (1996) (victim impact death penalty statute upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court); State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999) (the Constitutional rights of the victim survivors under the Victim’s Rights Amendment are sufficient to warrant a change of venue in a death penalty case); State v. Smith, 310 N.J.Super. 140 (App. Div. 1998) (permitting child victim to testify over closed circuit television); Gallara v. Koskovich, 364 N.J. Super 418 (Law Div. 2003) (court upholds claim of liability of sporting goods store for guns stolen and used in the murder of two victims); State v. Hill, 155 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1998) (restitution may be ordered against defendant to pay third parties who have reimbursed a crime victim for losses suffered as a result of criminal conduct); State v. Cusumano, 396 N.J. Super. 305 (App.Div. 2004) and State in the Interest of K.P., 311 N.J. Super 123 (Ch. Div. 1996) where Judge Patrick Roma opined:

[T]he court finds that the [constitutional] amendment provides victims with specific rights, and that these rights carry with them standing for a victim to voice their concerns and protect their constitutional rights. The court finds a victim is entitled to equality of remedy as required by the constitutional amendment. The court finds that denying the victim in this case ... would infringe upon her right to be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system.” *Id.* at 142.

The United States Supreme Court recognized this dynamics of victimization in the landmark victims’ rights case of Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1991) where Justice Souter stated:

Every defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for criminal responsibility that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a unique person, like himself, and that the person to be killed probably has close associates, "survivors," who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death. Just as defendants know that they are not faceless human ciphers, they know that their victims are not valueless fungibles, and just as defendants appreciate the web of relationships and dependencies in which they live, they know that their victims are not human islands, but individuals with parents or children, spouses or friends or dependents.

Thus, when a defendant chooses to kill, or to raise the risk of a victim's death, this choice necessarily relates to a whole human being and threatens an association of others, who may be distinctly hurt."

Id., at 2615-2616. (Souter, J. concurring).

The Department of Corrections must examine and weigh the request by Johnnie Williams in light of its impact on the victims and society as a whole. On one side of the scale is the request, without justification, of a convicted killer for special treatment. On the other side of the scale are the fairness, compassion, respect and dignity that the law mandates must be applied to the survivors of Mary Kay Connors. On the other side of the scale is the strong public interest for protecting crime victims which New Jersey has so dramatically demonstrated in the voting by 1.2 million of its citizens for the victim's rights amendment, or the dozens of victims' rights bills passed by the Legislature and signed into law by the past five Governors. On the other side of the scale are the many victim services organizations which have developed over the past decade with the sole purpose of providing compassion and dignity to crime victims.

Mary Kay Connors and other victims of homicide "are not human islands, but individuals with parents or children, spouses or friends or dependents." Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2515-16; and the harm to them "threatens an association of others, who may be distinctly hurt." Id. It is respectfully requested that the killer of this young mother and daughter be required to serve the punishment the justice system commanded at the time he was sentenced. Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

NEW JERSEY CRIME VICTIMS'  
LAW CENTER

Richard D. Pompelio

/ajp

cc.

Dorothy Feckley

Jacqueline J. Simonson